bend wrote:
argyll wrote:Agreed with the eye roll. You'd be laughed out of court trying you say that any identification should be thrown out of court because you were compelled to give your drivers license. Jsherk had given some good advice in the past but appears to be becoming more and more 'out there'. From counseling offers to counseling purgery to recommending a Supreme Court level Charter argument. Wow !
With regards to the purgery statement I addressed that in the other thread when I said: "It has not been my intention to offer any advice that is illegal or perceived as illegal. I will try to be more diligent in the future and consider my answers more carefully to avoid this."
Now the op asked for possible defenses, which I offered, none of which are illegal. And at the end of my advice I said: "Most likely taking a plea deal will be better for you."
So you may not like or agree with my opinion/advice about compelled evidence (which includes handing over driver's license), but it is valid. These are all cases that support compelled evidence being thrown out:
R. v. Slopek 1974 OJ No 826
R. v. Soules, 2011 ONCA 429
R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 SCR 353, 2009 SCC 32
R. v. White, [1999] 2 SCR 417, 1999 SCC 689
R. v. Dick, 1947 CanLII 12 (ON CA)
R. v. Barrett, 1993 CanLII 3426 (ON CA)
R. v. Moore-McFarlane, 2001 ONCA
R. v. Sabri, 2002 ONCA
R. v. Panko, 2010 ONCA 660
Horvath v. The Queen, [1979] 2 SCR 376, 1979 CanLII 16 (SCC)
R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 SCR 449, 1998 SCC 798
R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, 2000 SCC 38
Just a few excerpts:
Paragraph [90] of R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 SCR 353, 2009 SCC 32 [90] This case concerns s. 24(2). However, it is important to note at the outset that the common law confessions rule, quite apart from s. 24(2), provides a significant safeguard against the improper use of a statement against its maker. Where a statement is made to a recognized person in authority, regardless of whether its maker is detained at the time, it is inadmissible unless the Crown can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that it was made voluntarily. Only if such a statement survives scrutiny under the confessions rule and is found to be voluntary, does the s. 24(2) remedy of exclusion arise. Most commonly, this will occur because of added protections under s. 10(b) of the Charter.
Paragraph [9] of R. v. Slopek 1974 OJ No 826 [9] It should be pointed out that this Court affirmed the judgment of Mr. Justice Addy only insofar as it held that a statement made by the driver at the scene of the accident with respect to his having the care, control or the car, was not automatically admissible by virtue of the statutory obligation imposed upon him, but that it was necessary to prove such statement was not otherwise involuntary. In giving judgment Jessup, J.A. speaking for the Court said: "I would dismiss the appeal on the sole ground that I am of the opinion that the existence of a statutory duty under section 233 of the Criminal Code does not dispense with the onus upon the Crown to establish a statement made pursuant to that section was not otherwise involuntary. I do not wish to be taken as accepting otherwise the reasons which Addy, J.'s judgment proceeded."
Paragraphs [40],[42],[43] of R. v. Soules, 2011 ONCA 429 [40] In Powers, the majority referred to Orbanski/Elias and held that White was determinative of the issue. That is, statutorily compelled statements were not admissible for any purpose including for the purpose of establishing reasonable grounds: Powers at para. 38. It is this portion of Powers that the Crown contends cannot be correct.
[42] I disagree. The Crowns reliance on Thomsen and other like cases is misplaced, and for a very noteworthy reason: the questioning by police in those cases does not involve compelled answers. In each of them the motorist can refuse to answer if he or she chooses; they are not forcefully enlisted in aid of their own prosecution. For example, in the case of a breath demand made by a police officer pursuant to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code, the motorist is legally obligated to comply with the demand; nevertheless, s. 7 continues to furnish him or her with the right to choose whether or not to speak with the police – a choice statutory compulsion clearly eradicates. There is absolutely no legal compulsion to speak or provide information in any of the cases cited.
[43] In the result, Powers was correct to hold that White was determinative of the issue. The statutorily compelled admission from Mr. Soules in our case is not admissible for the purpose of establishing grounds for making either the ASD or the breath demand. Indeed, as Iacobucci J. made clear in White at para. 70: "The protection afforded by the principle against self- incrimination doesnot vary based upon the relative importance of the self-incriminatory information sought to be used. If s. 7 is engaged by the circumstances surrounding the admission into evidence of a compelled statement, the concern with self-incrimination applies in relation to all of the information transmitted in the compelled statement. Section 7 is violated and that is the end of the analysis, subject to issues relating to s. 24(1) of the Charter."